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Abstract
What was the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Brexit saga? And what will the impact of
Brexit be over the future structure and activity of the CJEU? This article deals with this twofold question and explores three
different issues. Firstly, we will offer a reflection on the questions and the risks raised by the Wightman case, where the
CJEU ruled on the unilateral revocation of the UK notification of its intention to withdraw from the European Union under
Art. 50 Treaty of the EU. Secondly, we will analyse the impact of Brexit on the composition of the CJEU and, particularly,
the risks for the independence of the Court raised by the advanced termination of the mandate of the British Advocate
General. Thirdly, wewill provide some insights on the scope of the jurisdiction of the CJEU in the post-Brexit Union, empha-
sising how theWithdrawal Agreementmaintained its jurisdiction during and even beyond the transition period. This article
reflects the events that took place up to 6 October 2020.
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1. Introduction
In Bulmer (HP) Ltd v. J Bollinger SA (1974), a famous deci-
sion given by the House of Lords, Lord Denning, one of
the most influent lawyers in the history of the United
Kingdom (UK), described the impact of Community law
over the British legal system by using the image of
the “incoming tide” which “flows into the estuaries and
up the rivers. It cannot be held back.” The irony in
this is that Brexit can be defined as an effort to push
the tide of EU law back to recover the original mean-
ing of British sovereignty, understood as parliamentary
supremacy (Dicey, 1885) in a context characterised by a
partly written constitution. This is a legal system charac-
terised by a “process of gradually converting an uncodi-
fied constitution into a codified one” (Bogdanor, Khaitan,
& Vogenauer, 2010), so that fundamental aspects of
the British constitution are not governed by statutes or
written norms (Bogdanor, 2019). From the EU perspec-
tive, the Brexit saga was a shocking turning point, the
moment of rupture with its traditional “awkward part-
ner” (George, 1990). In this saga, the Court of Justice
of the European Union (CJEU) played a relevant role
and contributed to disclosing the tensions between the
respect for national sovereignty and the independence
of supranational institutions.
The purpose of this article is twofold: to investi-
gate the role of the CJEU during the Brexit process
and the possible impact of the British withdrawal of
the European Union (EU) membership on the composi-
tion and jurisdiction of the Court. The centrality of the
CJEU as acknowledged by thewording of theWithdrawal
Agreement (hereafter WA; Council of the European
Union, 2019; see also Council of the European Union,
2020) derived from the existence of a legal ‘knot,’ that
is, the web of norms created by years of membership
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of the UK within the EU. As evidence of this, consid-
er that EU law has over the years contributed to cre-
ating new rights that have partly been retained by the
domestic norms governing the repeal of EU law in the
UK (see UK Parliament, 2018). Another example of the
complex context triggered by the Europeanisation of
the British system is the first Miller case, firstly heard
before the High Court (R [Miller] v. Secretary of State
for Exiting the European Union, 2016) and then before
the UK Supreme Court (R [Miller] v. Secretary of State
for Exiting the EuropeanUnion, 2017),which emphasised
the importance of the EU integration for the genesis of
a new category of rights. In addition, a series of recent
cases concerning the validity of the Council Decision
(EU) 2020/135 (Council of the European Union, 2020) as
regards the breach of EU citizenship rights also shows
how difficult it is to cut legal ties without breaking funda-
mental rights that becamepart of the British constitution
(see JU and Others v. Council, pending; Price v. Council,
pending; Shindler and Others v. Council, pending). All this
means that the EU membership has created a constitu-
tional legacy in the UK that will not be cancelled: it is a
legal knot that cannot easily be cut.
Alongside the several economic and political issues
that needed to be settled, the legal ties connecting the
Member States in the EU legal order and governing such
economic and political relationships indeed emerged as
a critical knot in the Brexit process. By triggering the
withdrawal process, the UK has not only mobilised polit-
ical actors and their negotiations, but it has also shak-
en the existing legal interdependences, which remained
relevant for all the time that the UK continued to be
a Member State and will still affect to some extent
the post-Brexit Union. The CJEU as the guardian of the
Treaties has thus become a key player to unleash con-
flicts in the withdrawal process.
This article focuses on the role of the CJEU in Brexit,
with the aimof disclosing themain legacies of Brexit from
the perspective of this key institution. The analysis is thus
divided into three parts, each highlighting themain issues
of the two research questions recalled above. The first
part (Sections 2 and 3) examines how the CJEU contribut-
ed to interpreting Art. 50 of the Treaty of the EU (TEU),
which guided the Brexit process. The analysis is thus cen-
tred on the Wightman case, which set a milestone in
the governance of the withdrawal process. The subse-
quent parts focus on how Brexit will likely influence the
role of the CJEU in the post-Brexit Union. They are thus
devoted to the analysis of the independence of the Court
(Section 4) and the scope of its jurisdiction (Section 5)
in the post-Brexit Union. The final remarks highlight the
importance of Brexit for the future case law of the CJEU.
2. Brexit and National Sovereignty in the EU
Legal Order
During the Brexit process, the CJEU was called to inter-
pret Art. 50 TEU under preliminary ruling proceedings
in the case Andy Wightman and Others v. Secretary of
State for Exiting the European Union (2018). The prelim-
inary ruling has worked as a powerful bridge connect-
ing national judges and the CJEU. According to Art. 267
TFEU governing the procedure, national judges may or
shall raise preliminary questions to the CJEU concerning
either the validity or the interpretation of EU law if these
questions are necessary to solve a national case. In the
Wightman case, the Scottish Inner Court of Session asked
the CJEU to clarify whether the British decision of with-
drawal could be revoked unilaterally. The national court
raised the question because Art. 50 TEU did not express-
ly regulate the right to revocation of the notification to
withdraw. In its capacity of exclusive interpreter of the
Treaties, the CJEU had to rule on whether such revoca-
tion was admissible, and if so, whether it could be unilat-
eral or should be subject to specific conditions.
When deciding on a number of crucial aspects gov-
erning the departure of aMember State from the EU, the
CJEU contributed not only to clarifying the viable options
concerning Brexit, but also offering several insights on
the nature of the EU legal order itself (Martinico &
Simoncini, 2020). It particularly emphasised the prece-
dence of national sovereignty in the decision towithdraw
the membership and reverse such a decision, over any
other considerations of supranational autonomy and the
legitimate expectations of the remainingMember States.
Both Advocate General (AG) Campos Sánchez-
Bordona and the Grand Chamber of the Court recog-
nised that Art. 50 TEU neither prohibits expressly nor
authorises explicitly any form of revocation of the with-
drawal notification, but they identified behind the legal
minimalism of Art. 50 TEU the existence of a sovereign
right of theMember State to reverse the withdrawal pro-
cess. When filling the lacuna in the black letter of the
law, their respective interpretations however differed in
the conceptualisation of such right and the conditions
for its exercise.
AG Campos Sánchez-Bordona relied on internation-
al law and held Art. 50 TEU as “lex specialis, in respect of
the general rules of international lawonwithdrawal from
treaties, but not a self-contained provisionwhich exhaus-
tively governs each and every detail of the withdraw-
al process” (Campos Sánchez-Bordona, 2018, para. 85).
The CJEU, instead, refused to treat thewithdrawal and its
reversal as an international law issue related to the par-
ticipation of States in a Treaty and reaffirmed the differ-
ence between the EU legal order and “ordinary interna-
tional treaties” (Andy Wightman and Others v. Secretary
of State for Exiting the European Union, 2018, para. 44),
considering its findings “only corroborated by the pro-
visions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of the
Treaties” (Campos Sánchez-Bordona, 2018, para. 70).
The Court started its reasoning from the idea that the EU
is an autonomous legal order with its own institutions
and independent sources of law. It thus justified its inter-
pretation on the grounds of the “structured network of
principles, rules and mutually interdependent legal rela-
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tions binding the EU and its Member States reciprocal-
ly as well as binding its Member States to each other”
(Campos Sánchez-Bordona, 2018, para. 45).
The Court stressed the autonomy of EU law and
marked the distinctiveness of EU law and dualism in the
application of international law. The EU legal order shall
be protected against the external interference of inter-
national law, including in the foundational moment of
withdrawal. Wightman reiterated the consistency of the
case law since the VanGend and Loos case (NVAlgemene
Transport- en Expeditie Onderneming van Gend &
Loos v. Netherlands Inland Revenue Administration,
1963), which “expressly cut the umbilical cord with clas-
sic international law” (Schütze, 2015, p. 79). The auton-
omy of EU law thus brings about the assessment of
the relevant question in light of the Treaties. The Court
emphasised this approach both in the Kadi case when
assessing the validity of restrictions imposed on sus-
pected terrorists (Yassin Abdullah Kadi and Al Barakaat
International Foundation v. Council of the European
Union and Commission of the European Communities,
2008; see also Avbelj, Fontanelli, & Martinico, 2014;
Simoncini, 2009) and in the Opinion 2/13 on the EU
accession to the European Convention of Human Rights
(Court of Justice of the European Union, 2014; see also
Eeckhout, 2015)—both referred to in Wightman.
The CJEU reconnected the right of withdrawal
to the right of the State “to retain its status as a
Member State of the European Union, a status which
is not suspended or altered by that notification” (Andy
Wightman and Others v. Secretary of State for Exiting
the European Union, 2018, para. 59). The Court focused
on the Member States’ commitment to the common
values of integration and the goals of the EU project
and emphasised that no Member State can be forced
to leave against its own will (Andy Wightman and
Others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union, 2018, para. 66). As Frantziou and Eeckhout (2017,
pp. 699–700, 702–703) underlined, such interdepen-
dence means that a complex system of rights is at stake
in thewithdrawal process and this requires a specific con-
stitutional reading of Art. 50 TEU.
This characterisation of the sovereign right of the
Member State to commit to and withdraw from the EU
legal system persuaded the Court not to impose any
condition on the exercise of this right. To avoid the risk
of undue interferences with the right, the Court only
required the revocation to be “unequivocal and uncon-
ditional, that is to say that purpose of that revocation is
to confirm the EUmembership of theMember State con-
cerned under the terms that are unchanged as regards
its status as a Member State, and that revocation brings
the withdrawal procedure to an end” (Andy Wightman
and Others v. Secretary of State for Exiting the European
Union, 2018, para. 74).
The CJEU thus ruled against the Council and the
Commission, which asked for the revocation to be sub-
ject to mutual consent through the unanimous approval
of the European Council. The Court also deviated from
the Opinion of the AG, who considered that the unilater-
al exercise of the right should be reasonably tempered
to prevent procedural abuses. In the AG’s interpretation,
revocation should be exercised by ensuring mutual trust
between the departing State and the EU and required
reasonable justifications to ensure that collateral legal
tactics do not drain negotiations and do not turn a right
into a privilege.
The absence of procedural requirements, however,
weakens the capability of the CJEU to control the authen-
ticity of the reversal decision. When rejecting any condi-
tions of mutuality, in fact, the Court implicitly required
all the other Member States to trust the declaration of
the State to reverse its withdrawal intentions unequivo-
cally and unconditionally. The CJEU relied on the good
faith of the decision of the departing State to genuine-
ly reverse the withdrawal, and thus bound the remain-
ing Member States to that decision. This means that
the principle of mutual trust still applies in the rela-
tions between both un-departing Member States and
the other Member States, because they are all commit-
ted to the same values. As the CJEU suggested—among
others—in Opinion 2/13, mutual trust is a pillar of EU
law, which operates as a presumption in the relations
among Member States and as cases in asylum law show,
can only be challenged under very specific circumstances
(see Canor, 2013).
3. Systemic Risks of the Wightman Ruling
InWightman, for the first time, the CJEU offered an inter-
pretation of Art. 50 TEU, by reading this provision in com-
bination with other norms of the Treaties and in light of
some historical decisions. On the one hand, the Court
recalled cases like Les Verts, Kadi and Opinion 2/13 to
confirm the sui generis (and constitutional) nature of the
EU (Andy Wightman and Others v. Secretary of State for
Exiting the European Union, 2018, para. 44). On the oth-
er hand, the CJEU read Art. 50 TEU from the perspective
of the values that characterise the supranational integra-
tion process (Sarmiento, 2018).
As regards the context of Article 50 TEU, reference
must be made to the 13th recital in the preamble to the
TEU, the first recital in the preamble to the TFEU and
Article 1 TEU, which indicate that those treaties have as
their purpose the creation of an ever closer union among
the peoples of Europe, and to the second recital in the
preamble to the TFEU, from which it follows that the
EU aims to eliminate the barriers which divide Europe
(European Union, 2016a, 2016b). It is also appropriate
to underline the importance of:
The values of liberty and democracy, referred to in
the second and fourth recitals of the preamble to the
TEU, which are among the common values referred
to in Article 2 of that Treaty and in the preamble to
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, and
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which thus form part of the very foundations of the
EU legal order (see to that effect, Yassin Abdullah Kadi
and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council
of the European Union and Commission of the
European Communities, 2008, paras. 303–304). (Andy
Wightman and Others v. Secretary of State for Exiting
the European Union, 2018, para 62)
However, the reading proposed by the CJEU presents
some risks. The language of the sovereign rights can
expose the EU and the remaining States to abuses in
the unilateral revocation of Art. 50 TEU. For instance,
States could use the threat of exit to renegotiate better
(from their point of view) conditions. To avoid this sce-
nario, we think that “a sustainable reading of Art. 50 TEU”
(Martinico & Simoncini, 2020) is necessary to escape any
instrumental (ab)uses of this norm. The frequent men-
tion made by the CJEU of the concept of sovereignty is
a ground of criticism in this respect, as it risks expos-
ing Art. 50 TEU to perilous unilateral readings. The word
“sovereign” was repeated six times in the English version
of theWightman, becoming its keyword. Such an empha-
sis on this concept remains unbalanced in so far as the
CJEU did not refer to the principle of sincere coopera-
tion. It seems to us that the Luxembourg Court exces-
sively focused on an approach aimed at guaranteeing the
sovereign choice at the costs of the plurilateral design of
Art. 50 TEU. This creates a systemic risk, which may trig-
ger serious instability in the withdrawal process. This risk
is only mitigated by the fact that Art. 50 TEU cannot be
read as if it were detached from the broader constella-
tion of values preserved by the EU Treaties.
4. The Independence of the CJEU in the Post-Brexit
Union
In accordance with Art. 50 (3) TEU, the Treaties cease
to apply to the withdrawing Member State from the
date of entry into force of the WA (European Union,
2016a). As stated in the Declaration of 29 January
2020 by the conference of the representatives of the
Governments of the Member States (Conference of the
Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, 2020, 29 January), the ongoingmandates ofmem-
bers of EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies nom-
inated, appointed or elected in relation to the UK’s mem-
bership of the Union end on the date of withdrawal.
This affected the same composition of the CJEU. The
British judges and the British AG, Eleonor Sharpston,
were called to leave their mandates. If the departure of
British judges stems from the black letter of Art. 19 (2)
TEU, for the AG there is no specific legal basis that impos-
es such a choice. As under Art. 19 (2) TEU, in fact, both
the General Court and the CJEU are composed of judges
fromeachMember State, British judges had to terminate
their mandate in advance.
It was the Declaration of 29 January 2020 that
applied the same destiny to the AG permanently nomi-
nated by the UK, but not legally constrained by nation-
ality clauses. On the one hand, under Declaration 38
annexed to the Lisbon Treaty, the system of appointment
of the AG provided that bigger Member States—that
is, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, the UK and Poland—
should permanently appoint six AGs, while the others—
currently five—will rotate among the smaller States
(European Union, 2016c). On the other hand, art. 8 of
Protocol No 3 on the Statute of the CJEU extends to
the Advocates-General the guarantees on the judges’
immovability (European Union, 2016d). According to
art. 5 replacement, death, resignation are the only rea-
sons for dismissal normal, while under art. 6 depriva-
tion of office may occur “only if, in the unanimous opin-
ion of the Judges and Advocates General of the Court
of Justice, he no longer fulfils the requisite conditions or
meets the obligations arising from his office” (European
Union, 2016d). No nationality requirement for the exer-
cise of the AG’s functions is envisaged.
There is no apparent legal basis for dismantling the
guarantees that frame the functions of the British AG.
Unlike for judges, no Treaty provision subordinates the
functions of the Advocates General as members of the
Court of Justice to nationality clauses; in addition, the
Statute of the Court, which has the same force of the
Treaties as primary law, does not provide any exclusion
clause linked to national representation. This persuaded
British AG Sharpston to act for the annulment of the deci-
sions concerning her removal in two actions that were
kept confidential. She asked for the annulment of the
Declaration of 29 January 2020, insofar as it integrat-
ed her post in the rotation system among the Member
States. She also challenged the letter of 31 January 2020
that the President of the CJEU, Koen Lenaerts, addressed
to the President of the Council of the EU and of the
Conference of the Representatives of the Governments
of the Member States, Andrej Plenković, which con-
firmed the vacancy, while allowing her to keep the posi-
tion until her own replacement.
More recently, Sharpston also acted for the annul-
ment of Decision 2020/1251/EU (Representatives of
the governments of the Member States, 2020) which
appointed a new AG and she also asked for interim relief.
Two orders of the Vice-President of the CJEU (Council
of the European Union v. Eleanor Sharpston, 2020) set
aside the previous order of the Judge of the General
Court (see Eleanor Sharpston v. Council of the European
Union and Representatives of the Governments of the
Member States, 2020), granting as an interim measure
the suspension of the Decision of the Representatives
of the Governments of the Member State regarding
the appointment of a new AG. In the first order, the
Vice-President of the CJEU particularly found that the
General Court had erred in law when granting interim
measures, because the Decision 2020/1251/EU was an
act of theMember States acting in the Conference of the
Representatives of the Governments “collectively exer-
cising the competences of the Member States” and not
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of the Council, so that their act could not be subject
to judicial review by the EU courts (Representatives of
the governments of the Member States, 2020, para. 26).
When adjudicating the substance of the case, the
General Court thus relied on this interpretation of the
Vice-President of the CJEU and consequently dismissed
the action for annulment on the grounds that there
was no act adopted by an EU institution at stake that
could be subject to the judicial review of the Court
(see Eleanor Sharpston v. Council of the European Union
and Representatives of the Governments of the Member
States, 2020).
This intense litigation clearly shows the existing con-
cerns about the risk for the lack of independence of
the EU judicial branch and transparency since the AG
Sharpston was dismissed and replaced after a series of
decisions, which allegedly breached the relevant norms
governing the procedure (Kochenov & Butler, 2020a,
2020b, 2020c). The case discloses the tension between
the political opportunity of keeping an AG appointed by
the UK and the legal guarantees concerning the indepen-
dence of such a role. The case is peculiar because the
need to cut the political ties with the exiting Member
State directly clashes with the principle of independence
of courts that frames the rule of law in the EU and
its Member States. The tensions between the princi-
ple of national sovereignty and the independence of
EU institutions were brought within the organisation of
the Court, showing the legal difficulties to cut the exist-
ing interdependences between national sovereignty and
supranational autonomy. In other words, the case shows
the latent conflict between the principle of intergovern-
mentalism, which relates to the principle of national
sovereignty in the composition of EU institutions and the
principle of independence of the judiciary, which lies at
the roots of the rule of law and preserves the suprana-
tional function of the Court and its Advocates General.
For courts, independence has a specific legal mean-
ing. Although the CJEU has strongly contributed to the
implementation of the European project, its contribution
was grounded on the judicial neutrality to the interests
of the parties in the trial. Even more so, this applies to
an organ like the AG, which performs serving functions
aimed at the uniform interpretation and application of
EU law by a Court composed of national judges. The inde-
pendence of other institutions and, particularly, of the
Commission, instead, is a means to pursue political goals.
It is not neutrality to the interests at stake, but the discre-
tionary capability to choose among the interests at stake
and define how to best pursue supranational interests in
a wider accountability framework.
Legal scholarship has effectively pointed out that
the Declaration of 29 January 2020 has a clear politi-
cal value, but it cannot reverse legal provisions of the
Statute of the Court regulating AGs’ appointment and
removal, which have the force of primary law of the
Treaties (Halberstam, 2020; Kochenov, 2020; Pech, 2020).
Unlike protocols, declarations attached to the Treaties
are non-binding statements. Declaration 38 thus cannot
affect Art. 19 (2) TEU, according to which AGs “shall be
appointed by common accord of the governments of the
Member States for six years” and can be reappointed
(European Union, 2016a). In addition, Halberstam (2020)
considers that the recitals to the Brexit WA emphasis-
ing the end of the mandates of all members of institu-
tions have no binding force and that the inclusion of
AGs among the cohort of sacked officials does not nec-
essarily flow from Art. 101 WA, which refers to contin-
uing privileges and immunities of the members of insti-
tutions. He also questions whether the continuity of AG
Sharpston’s office until the appointment of the new AG
might be an implicit admission of the legitimacy of her
service. As Pech effectively held, “there cannot be an
application à la carte of the CJEU Statute: Either AG
Sharpston is covered by it or she isn’t. She cannot be the
Court’s Schrödinger’s AG,” trapped in the sort of paradox-
ical situation proposed by the Nobel Prize physicist in his
thought experiment of the cat both alive and dead at the
same time (Pech, 2020).
To protect the independence of the Court and the
rule of law, AG Sharpston should leave her position only
at the expiration of her six-year mandate. Otherwise,
there would be a breach of primary EU law “triggered by
a political declaration combined with one of her nation-
alities,” the British one (Kochenov, 2020). In Kochenov’s
words, the breach would create the conditions for
“humiliating our own Court through undermining both
its independence and its attempts to take the Rule
of Law seriously in the current difficult circumstances”
(Kochenov, 2020). Only the Court—according to its own
Statute—should “exclusively decide on the legal effects
of Brexit (if any) on the mandate of AG Sharpston. It is
not for political actors to decide this matter, in particular
via an entity which is not even mentioned once in either
the TEU or the TFEU” (Pech, 2020).
The rule of law should thus confer precedence on
the independent status of the Court, preserving its usu-
al functioning despite the occurrence of an exceptional
situation as Brexit is. Political changes shall not compro-
mise the correct functioning of independent institutions,
showing that the legal knot would not be cut where the
law of the Treaties prevails over political will. The first
findings on the AG Sharpston’s case show that so far, the
CJEU and the General Court have not entered the merit
of this issue. Yet, it remains to be seen if and how the
CJEU will reconcile its own independence with the dis-
missal of the AG in its next expected rulings.
5. The Jurisdiction of the CJEU in the Post-Brexit Union
On 1 October 2020 the Commission decided to trig-
ger the procedure to bring the UK before the CJEU
for violation of the WA. In particular, according to the
Commission some parts of the British Internal Market
Bill breaches the obligation of good faith enshrined in
Art. 5 of the WA and it also conflicts with the Protocol
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on Ireland and Northern Ireland. It has been argued
that the:
Internal Market Bill thus sets the scene for a perfect
constitutional storm: a confrontation with the EU, a
stand-off with the courts, a fundamental attack on the
rule of law, and a diminution of the UK’s commitment
to the rules-based international order. (Elliott, 2020)
In particular, clauses 44, 45 and 47 are the main sources
of such a conflict. In a nutshell, they provide ministers
with the “power to disapply or modify export decla-
rations and other exit procedures,” including “any exit
procedure that is applicable by virtue of the Northern
Ireland Protocol” (HM Government, 2020, clause 44).
They also give ministers the power to disapply or modify
the “effect of Article 10 of the Northern Ireland Protocol
(State aid)” (HM Government, 2020, clause 45). Finally,
clause 47 states that “regulations under section 44(1) or
45(1) are not to be regarded as unlawful on the grounds
of any incompatibility or inconsistency with relevant
international or domestic law” (HM Government, 2020).
Clause 47, in particular, openly clashes with the principle
of direct effect andwith other norms of international law,
as recognised by Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon
Lewis, who spoke of a violation of international law “in
a specific and limited way” at the House of Commons
on 8 September 2020. On this basis the Commission acti-
vated the procedure. This episode is very telling of the
central role that the CJEU can still play, especially in the
transition period. This is confirmed by many provisions,
among others, by Art. 131 of the WA, a clause function-
ing “as the juridicalmeans to ensure the transition period
maintains a ‘simulacrum’ of the supranational constitu-
tional order in relation to the UK immediately following
withdrawal” (Garner, 2020). This provision reads that:
During the transition period, the institutions, bodies,
offices and agencies of the Union shall have the pow-
ers conferred upon them by Union law in relation
to the UK and to natural and legal persons residing
or established in the UK. In particular, the Court of
Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction
as provided for in the Treaties.
The first paragraph shall also apply during the tran-
sition period as regards the interpretation and appli-
cation of this Agreement. (Council of the European
Union, 2019, C 384 I/63)
Not by coincidence, this provision, among others, has
created concerns and criticism among Brexiteers, as it
seems to confirm “the ‘after-life’ of Article 258 TFEU
before the end of the transitions period” (Garner, 2020).
Art. 258 TFEU is about the so-called infringement pro-
cedure, i.e., the mechanism according to which the
Commission may bring a State which does not comply
with EU before the Luxembourg Court. This procedure
is characterised by a pre-judicial phase in which the
Commission asks (by means of a formal notice) the State
to present its views regarding an alleged breach of EU
law. In light of the information brought by the State the
Commissionmay decide to send a formal request to com-
ply with EU law and, eventually, to bring the case to the
CJEU. Stepping back to the breach of the WA, in accor-
dance with the terms of the agreement, the CJEU is to
continue to have jurisdiction in any proceedings brought
by or against the UK before the end of the transition peri-
od, which is set as 31 December 2020. It is also to con-
tinue to have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on
requests from British courts and tribunals made before
the end of the transition period. The WA also makes a
distinction between pending cases (Art. 86) and new cas-
es before the CJEU (Art. 87). Art. 87 WA is particularly
intriguing as it reads:
1. If the European Commission considers that the UK
has failed to fulfil an obligation under the Treaties
or under Part Four of this Agreement before
the end of the transition period, the European
Commission may, within 4 years after the end
of the transition period, bring the matter before
the Court of Justice of the European Union in
accordance with the requirements laid down in
Article 258 TFEU or the second subparagraph of
Article 108(2) TFEU, as the case may be. The Court
of Justice of the European Union shall have juris-
diction over such cases.
2. If the UK does not comply with a decision referred
to in Article 95(1) of this Agreement, or fails to give
legal effect in the UK’s legal order to a decision, as
referred to in that provision, that was addressed
to a natural or legal person residing or established
in the UK, the European Commission may, within
4 years from the date of the decision concerned,
bring the matter to the Court of Justice of the
European Union in accordance with the require-
ments laid down in Article 258 TFEU or the sec-
ond subparagraph of Article 108(2) TFEU, as the
case may be. The Court of Justice of the European
Union shall have jurisdiction over such cases.
3. In deciding to bring matters under this Article, the
European Commission shall apply the same prin-
ciples in respect of the UK as in respect of any
Member State. (Council of the European Union,
2019, C 384 I/45)
This was one of the most contested provisions by the UK,
since it extends the jurisdiction of the Court even after
the end of the transition period. For the sake of clarity,
Art. 89 WA confirms the binding nature of these kinds of
judgements “in their entirety on and in the UK” (Council
of the European Union, 2019, C 384 I/45). Another con-
tested provision of theWA is Art. 158, according towhich
the CJEU has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on
requests concerning cases “commenced at first instance
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within 8 years from the end of the transition period
before a court or tribunal in the UK,”where “a question is
raised concerning the interpretation of Part Two of this
Agreement, and where that court or tribunal considers
that a decision on that question is necessary to enable it
to give judgment in that case” (Council of the European
Union, 2019, C 384 I/45-46).
A similar scheme is applied to cases concerning
Art. 18 (Issuance of residence documents) and 19
(Issuance of residence documents during the transition
period) of the Agreement. Finally, another confirmation
of the persistence of the relevance of the case law of the
Luxembourg Court can be found in Art. 174, which reads:
Where a dispute submitted to arbitration in accor-
dance with this Title raises a question of interpreta-
tion of a concept of Union law, a question of inter-
pretation of a provision of Union law referred to in
this Agreement or a question of whether the United
Kingdom has complied with its obligations under
Article 89(2), the arbitration panel shall not decide on
any such question. In such case, it shall request the
Court of Justice of the European Union to give a ruling
on the question. The Court of Justice of the European
Union shall have jurisdiction to give such a ruling
which shall be binding on the arbitration panel. The
arbitration panel shall make the request referred to in
the first subparagraph after having heard the parties.
(Council of the European Union, 2019, C 384 I/86-87)
There are then other provisions that seem to confirm
the persistent relevance of the CJEU’s case law. Even at
national level Art. 26 of the EU (WA) Act 2020 about
“retained EU lawand relevant separation agreement law”
confirms the significance of the case law of the CJEU
(UK Parliament, 2020). If, on the one hand, it is clear that
judges are no longer bound by the case law of the CJEU
on the interpretation of retained EU law, on the other
hand, this does not exclude that they may take it into
account. This was also explicitly suggested by Art. 6 of
the EUWithdrawal Act of 2018, which reads that “a court
or tribunal may have regard to anything done on or after
exit day by the European Court, another EU entity or the
EU so far as it is relevant to any matter before the court
or tribunal” (UK Parliament, 2018).
This is understandable after all, since retained EU
law has been shaped by the interpretation of the
Luxembourg Court over the years. Moreover, one should
not forget that the UK is a common law system based on
the stare decisis principle, which inevitably tend to be
conservative. This could represent another reason why
the activity of the CJEU could be relevant even in the
future, within the British borders.
6. Final Remarks
Brexit was a landmark event in the characterisation of
the relationship between the EU and its Member States.
The “incoming tide” described by Lord Denning (1974)
showed all its force in the moment of maximum friction;
that is, thewithdrawal of EUmembership. However, even
after Brexit, the inextricable knot that the membership
created will not vanish magically in one blow. As this arti-
cle demonstrated, Brexit set a milestone for EU law and
the CJEU has been one of its main interpreters. In a nut-
shell, the CJEUhas shed some light on the structure of the
EU and the relationship between the EU and its Member
States, confirming its key role in the interpretation of the
Treaties and in the preservation of the smooth function-
ing of the EU legal order. From this standpoint, the legacy
of Brexit is destined to last beyond the individual case of
the UK and to affect the future of the EU legal order.
The main legacy is the Wightman case, where the
Grand Chamber of the CJEU interpreted Art. 50 TEU. This
was the first time that the CJEU engaged with the inter-
pretation of this provision and aimed to clarify the func-
tioning of the withdrawal process. Wightman disclosed
the tensions between national sovereignty and EUmem-
bership and opened some potential issues in the exercise
of national right to revocation of the withdrawal deci-
sion. As this article pointed out, the CJEU affirmed the
existence of an unconditional right to repent and reverse
the withdrawal process, which might bring about some
systemic issues in the functioning of the negotiations for
the withdrawal. Even though this was not the case for
Brexit, the absence of any guarantees for the remaining
Member States in the unilateral revocation of the with-
drawal decision creates a precarious equilibrium in the
application of Art. 50 TEU.
In addition, Brexit re-shaped to some extent the inde-
pendence and the jurisdiction of the CJEU. As analysed,
the tensions between the national composition of EU
institutions and their supranational character reflected
upon the composition of the EU judiciary and, controver-
sially, upon the mandate of its Advocates General before
the CJEU. The pending actions brought by British AG
Sharpston are going to clarify how independent the EU
judiciary is. The settlement of this case will provide fur-
ther insights that will impact on general understanding
of the role of the judiciary. As a second legacy, Brexit has
thus forced the EU and the CJEU to reflect on the inde-
pendence of its supranational institutions and the preva-
lence of the rule of law over political agreements.
The UK accession to the European Communities in
1972 had an impact over the style of the CJEU’s decisions
and on its legal reasoning (Pierdominici, 2020, p. 317)
and on this basis more recently it has been argued that
changes in the composition of the CJEU shall impact on
the use of precedents in the case lawof the CJEU (Fjelstul,
2018). Although possible, it is also true that the CJEU
does not consider itself as bound to the stare decisis
principle (Jacob, 2014). It is also likely that Brexit might
produce some changes in the legal reasoning and style
of decisions of the CJEU as had happened after the UK
accession (Nicola, 2017), but this can only be tested in
the long run.
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The third legacy of Brexit concerns the jurisdiction
of the CJEU. As seen, if Brexit was supposed to cut the
UK’s relationship with the CJEU, the WA maintained its
jurisdiction, which in practice extended beyond the tran-
sition period. The CJEU will maintain a crucial role and
even at national level judges could take its case law into
account as provided by the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. All
this means that the legal knot cannot be definitely cut.
It needs to be reassembled in the post-Brexit scenario,
so that existing legal ties can be framed in the changed
UK-EU relationships.
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